Showing posts with label Stu Silberman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Stu Silberman. Show all posts

Saturday, May 7, 2011

Parents Furious When Buses Strand Field Trip Kids in Cincinnati

As though gas prices were not as issue, two Fayette County Public School buses were ordered to make two round trips to Cincinnati for one field trip Thursday: one round trip to take 120 Sandersville Elementary School second graders to the Cincinnati Zoo, and one more trip to pick them up.

This, because the transportation department, after approving the field trip and calculating costs to the school, directed the drivers to come back to Lexington and run their regular routes for the afternoon, and only then return to Cincinnati to get the kids - effectively doubling the expense of the trip.

A KSN&C reader reported, "I heard that the buses did not return to Cincinnati until around 7 pm and they didn't get home until around 9 pm. I heard that one of the students involved in this mess was Doug Barnett's kid and that he may have been pretty irate at transportation management about how all of this went down."

KSN&C was able to confirm that one of the second graders was indeed David Barnett, son of newly-elected Board of Education member Doug Barnett, and the elder Barnett was a chaperon on the trip. Like other students in his class, David paid his $10 for the field trip; half for the zoo and half for the bus. The students expected to leave Lexington around 8:30 am and head back home around 4:30 pm, but it was 9:30 am before they could get away.

It would be 11 am before the students reached the zoo. That's roughly when Barnett learned that the buses had been ordered back to Lexington, leaving a large number of seven-year olds and chaperons without transportation, should some unforeseen emergency have made that an issue.

By the time the buses made their afternoon runs back in Lexington and then returned to Cincinnati, it was 7:15 pm. Parents who were expecting their children to return home around 6 pm saw them next somewhere around 9 pm. A number of them were livid. If we assume that most of the children started heading to school somewhere around 7 am that morning, then the planned 9-hour day turned into a 14-hour day.

KSN&C asked Barnett to confirm whether he was irate, as our reader had suggested. He said, "I would have used the term furious." As a chaperon on the trip Barnett "saw the whole thing play out...I would have been deeply concerned even if David's class were not involved," Barnett said.

In the wake of the parent's response to the second grade trip a planned trip to the Newport Aquarium by Sandersville's first grade class was cancelled because of these same transportation issues.

Barnette "asked [Fayette County Schools Superintendent] Stu [Silberman]to investigate and resolve this matter because it should not be an event to get kids to and from field trips." He got district policy in return.

"I was told that this happened because we have a shortage of drivers and that the school has the option of using charters." Silberman referred Barnett to Policy 06.14 AP.1. One wonders if the school will now be billed for two round trips.

"There is also some notice (not in policy) that says substitutes can't be used for field trips and that two one-way trips could occur so that all routes can be completed," Barnett said. "I think this is process is too confusing and inefficient...for younger kids. I think this needs to be examined more because who knows how many times this has happened."

Barnett also wonders why a city the size of Lexington has a driver shortage.

On reflection, Barnett said "the teachers and staff at Sandersville did an absolutely wonderful job with the kids at all times on the trip. I told Stu I would have given those five teachers a gold star because of the transportation issue they had to deal with. I'm proud of each of them."

"I've calmed down a whole lot since Thursday," Barnette said.

This from FCPS Policy:

TRANSPORTATION 06.14 AP.1
Use of Buses- Special Activity Trips


Categories of Service
Regular Service - Regular route service consists of transportation of students from home to school and back, including Kindergarten, School for the Deaf, School for the Blind, and Vocational School transportation.

Program Service - Program service includes Extended School Services (includes Summer School), Community Based Instruction, Child Development, Safety City, Dental and Clothing trips, Detention Programs, Family Resource Center, and Teen Mother Program.

Activity Trips - Activity trip service includes field trips, band and athletic trips, Arts in Basic Education (ABE), After School Activities and other non-recurring services.

Payment for Services
Regular and program services will be funded from within either the Transportation Division or from special program funds administered from the District level. Activity trip costs will be billed directly to schools.

Basis for Cost
Transportation service costs are based on a formula consisting of two (2) primary components:
1. Bus cost per mile, which is calculated by taking the entire transportation budget (less driver, driver assistant, and clerical personnel costs), then dividing the remainder by the total number of miles driven during the fiscal year.
2. Driver’s salary, which bill regular hours at an average of the existing regular hourly rates of the drivers on the trip list. Overtime hours are billed at 1½ times the regular average. Equity of billing is obtained by the establishment of an average cost for trips within a 50 mile radius of Lexington.

This process permits all schools to pay the same amount for trips to the same destination. Academic and special activity transportation services will be billed either to schools or to central program managers at a rate based on the above formula. The trip cost will be calculated annually and included in budget preparation guidance.

Driver Compensation
Drivers shall be paid for all actual driving hours plus time they are required to be on duty. However, such trips shall not provide less compensation than if the driver had been working normal confirmation times.

Availability of Buses
Buses will be made available as needed, except that activity and program services are restricted to times other than when regular services are being provided, and the number of buses assigned to special activity and ABE events, together, shall not exceed 30 buses per day.

Priority of Service
Within the previous priorities, at the beginning of each school year buses shall be reserved on scheduled ABE days for ABE events until October 1. Unreserved buses shall at that time become available for assignment for other trip purposes.

Use of Buses- Special Activity Trips
Bus Reservations
Trips sponsors wishing to request bus transportation for a school trip must complete the required Transportation Request Form, which can be accessed from the Transportation listing on District’s web site (Downloadable Forms).
Availability of buses on a particular date may be obtained and the transportation service reserved for a period of 24 hours by calling the Transportation Division prior to close of business on the following day in order to maintain the reservation.

Use of Food Services
Any time activity trips take students away from their school over the lunch period, teachers are responsible for notifying the cafeteria manager at the time the trip is confirmed. Whenever feasible, box lunches prepared by the cafeteria staff should be considered. This will address the problem of forgotten lunches and will make the trip less expensive for students qualifying for free or reduced-price meals. The Transportation Request Form contains a space for cafeteria requirements.

Seniority Cycle
The seniority trip list for Category II trips shall be cycled to the beginning of the list each week, or more often as necessary to ensure that trips are assigned to the most senior drivers.

Removal from Trip List
Drivers shall be removed from the trip list after turning down three (3) trips. Removal from the list will remain in effect for 90 days. Turn down of a trip within 24 hours of the trip date will result in immediate removal from the trip list, unless the driver was physically unable to take the trip.

Relief Drivers
A relief driver shall not be assigned trips that will interfere with his/her duties as a relief driver (i.e., overnight trips).

Review/Revised:7/26/10

Monday, April 4, 2011

No Oral Argument in Hurley-Richards Appeal

A quick check on the Hurley-Richards case shows that a "non-oral notice" was filed in mid February. This means that oral arguments will not be taken in the case. This is actually fairly typical. Most appellate reviews, a court administrator tells KSN&C, are conducted through legal briefs.

Rosalind Hurley-Richards, a second grade teacher at Liberty Elementary, was disciplined by FCPS for conduct unbecoming a teacher when she worked at Cardinal Valley Elementary, in February 2009, and an administrative tribunal upheld her suspension.

Hurley-Richards then filed a circuit court action in Fayette Circuit Court (09-CI-5311) appealing the tribunal's decision. The circuit court overturned the tribunal’s suspension of Richards.

Judge Ernesto Scorsone ruled that the conclusions of the tribunal were "without support of substantial evidence on the whole record" and provided "no evidentairy basis on which to support any suspension without pay." The court found Hurley-Richards' conduct reasonable, and the tribunal's conclusions incorrect. Scorsone reasoned that Hurley-Richards was maintaining order in the hallway following a student's attack on his sister and that Hurley-Richards had reason to believe the student posed a risk which would justify physical restraint.

Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman and the district is now appealing that decision (2010-CA-000840-MR).

A decision is slated for this month.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Holliday on Kentucky Newsmakers

Kentucky Education Commissioner Terry Holliday sat with WKYT's Bill Bryant this weekend for an interesting interview.

This from WKYT:

Highlights include:

  • The weather and calamity days under HB 427 which allow the Commissioner to excuse up to ten days. Nobody will go to school beyond June 21.
  • Holliday is looking at a switch to Average Daily Membership (ADM) rather than the current Average Daily Attendance (ADA) for calculating attendance. Probably a good move overall although it might not help small schools.
  • The TELL Survey has gather responses from about 25,000 Kentukcy teachers on working conditions and leadership in the schools. Look for results in May.
  • The state has removed about 17 school councils to date pursuant to (HB 176) Audit Team recommendations in low-performing schools.
  • Some stuff about conservative anxiety over cursive writing, civics, math by hand, grammar, penmanship... Holiday says we are "preparing children for their futures, not our past."
  • Holliday's best rejoinder came in response to concerns that today's students don't know their civics like their parents do. Holliday said, "I would challenge you: [You] pull randomly ten folks off the street and let me pull ten fourth graders and let's have a civics competition... I think our schools are doing pretty good work. Something happens when they become adults though. They forget what they learned in school."
  • Holliday is still open to charter schools and believes, "If parents have a choice, they're more engaged in their child's education." But he correctly reads the data an says there are some great charters and some really bad charters.
  • Rand Paul sees no federal role for education. Holliday disagrees and says [if there was no Department of Education] "I think children would suffer" particularly poor students and special needs students. "I think the federal government has a huge role to play in that.
  • A little chatter on the tenure debate.
  • Cooperation and collaboration with teachers, improved working conditions and fair evaluations...
  • Pension and health care..."about to put us out of business"
  • Stu at Prichard: "real excited about Stu going into that position"
  • Holliday's one goal: More kids graduate from HS college and career-ready
  • Bad budget and the Legislature: We look at 2013-14 as being a better session

Friday, March 11, 2011

Petrilli Appeal Denied

Court of Appeals Affirms Judge Ishmael in Petrilli Case

Procedural Error Helps Sink Petrilli

The “failure to specifically object
to the final written instructions means
the objection to the language. . .
has not been properly preserved for our review.”

--Kentucky Court of Appeals

Despite negative comments made during oral arguments by two of the three appeals court judges regarding jury instructions in the Petrilli case, the panel upheld those instructions in favor of the lower court and the Fayette County Schools today.

Former Booker T Washington Academy Principal Peggy Petrilli had appealed an August 14, 2009, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing, with prejudice, her claims against defendants, Fayette County Public Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman, and the Fayette County Board of Education.
Silberman and the Board cross appealed, asserting several errors by the trial court.
The Appeals Court ruling can be found by searching 2009-CA-001925 at the court's website.

Despite the judges' misgivings about the jury instruction, the court ultimately agreed with school district Attorney John McNeill that Petrilli did not "preserve the issue" of the threshold jury instruction for appellate review.
Failure to preserve an issue for review is a procedural matter for the courts. As I understand it, in order to “preserve” an issue for appellate review, the attorney must object to the matter during the trial, and it must be ruled on by the judge. McNeil argued successfully that Petrilli's Attorney J. Dale Golden’s objections came during a preliminary hearing, not during the trial itself.
The full court reasoned,
Petrilli argues that the trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act.

The jury was given the following threshold jury instruction: “Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 27, 2007?”

The jury marked “yes” and returned to the courtroom where the trial judge discharged them from further duties. Ms. Petrilli argues that the threshold instruction was given in error because it is completely different from the elements of her claims for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the Kentucky
Whistleblower Act.

The appellees argue that Petrilli did not preserve the issue of the threshold jury instruction for appellate review. In support of this argument, the appellees argue that Petrilli cites a discussion before the close of proof for the preservation of this issue. However, the record reveals that this was a preliminary discussion over the general structure of the jury instructions. According to the appellees, the trial court made it clear that it had put together an amalgamation set of instructions which included elements of both the Plaintiff and Defendant’s tendered instructions “for a
place to start” in drafting the final instructions.

According to the appellees, the trial court did not issue its final jury instructions until later that day, and only after the close of proof. Petrilli made no objection at that time to the threshold Question No. 1, and instead only objected to Jury Instruction No. 1, and her objection only dealt with whether the instruction should include a finding that Petrilli was a member of a protected class as it pertained to the reverse discrimination claim.

The “failure to specifically object to the final written instructions means the objection to the language. . . has not been properly preserved for our review.” Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 690 (Ky.App. 2009). Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 51(2) and (3) provide:
(2) After considering any tendered instructions ... the court shall show the parties the written instructions it will give the jury, allowing them an opportunity to make objections out of the hearing of the jury.

(3) No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection.
Because Ms. Petrilli did not object to the threshold jury instruction at the close of proof, we agree with the appellees that she did not preserve this argument for review on appeal.
Petrilli argues that simply tendering her own jury instructions preserved this issue for appeal. We disagree. In Boland, the Appellant submitted its own instructions, and in lieu of objecting to the language they later took issue with on appeal, asked the court if they could “stand on their instructions as submitted.” Id. at 690.
A panel of this Court held that the particular language the Appellant argued on appeal was improper, had not been objected to specifically, and thus the matter was
not properly preserved for appeal. In the instant case, Petrilli objected to a different jury instruction regarding her inclusion in a protected class for her reverse discrimination claim, but did not specifically object to the “voluntary” language contained threshold Question No. 1. Accordingly, Petrilli did not preserve this argument for appeal to this Court.
But that's not all. The court turned 180 degrees from their comments during oral arguments and concluded,
We agree with the appellees that the trial court’s reasoning for including the threshold jury instruction/question was basic and correct. If the jury believed from the evidence that Petrilli voluntarily resigned, then necessarily they must not have believed she was constructively discharged.

Judges Acree and Thompson agreed with the majority in the result only, and Judge Thompson wrote a separate opinion citing his disagreement with the court's analysis in the jury instruction finding. However, he writes that,

Despite my disagreement with the majority’s legal analysis, I nevertheless concur in the result because, at the close of trial, the appellees were entitled to a directed verdict. The evidence established that the parents, not the school board, were the perpetrators of the conduct complained of by Petrilli.

Perhaps Silberman's strongest argument throughout the case was his offer to return Petrilli to Northern Elementary. In a footnote the court agreed saying,

"a lateral transfer of a principal is not even considered a demotion as defined by [KRS 161.720]...Therefore, Silberman could have sent Petrilli back to Northern Elementary without her consent and without recourse. However, she declined the lateral transfer and instead resigned her position."

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Prichard Committee names Silberman as new executive director

Veteran educator recognized as state,
national leader for student achievement,
school improvement

Long-time school superintendent and education leader Stu Silberman was named Wednesday as executive director of the Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence.

Silberman, who recently announced his retirement as superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools, has been recognized by state and national education organizations for his student-centered leadership initiatives and his successful efforts to raise student achievement.

Silberman said, "It has always been my intent to make a difference in the lives of our children through public education, and I have been blessed to serve in positions that have enabled that opportunity. It is still my intent to make this difference, and I am honored by the opportunity to do this with the Prichard Committee. I have been a believer in the work of the Prichard Committee since I arrived in Kentucky in 1995. I believe this organization has and will continue to have a huge impact on the future of Kentucky's kids."

Silberman succeeds Dr. Robert F. Sexton, the committee's founding executive director who died in August 2010. Under Sexton's leadership, the Prichard Committee became a nationally recognized model for citizen engagement on behalf of improving education at all levels. The nonprofit citizens' organization, with members from across Kentucky, was founded in 1983.

"Since Bob Sexton's death, we have focused on honoring his legacy by continuing the important work that framed his career of public service," noted committee Chair Sam Corbett of Louisville. "The board is thrilled that Stu Silberman has agreed to lead that effort in the years ahead. We know he will bring his own special energy, creativity and vision to the Prichard Committee as we continue our push for the best possible education for every student in the Commonwealth."

Silberman became superintendent in Fayette County in 2004 following nine years in Owensboro as Daviess County superintendent. His 37-year career in education also included service in Tennessee as a teacher, assistant principal, principal and deputy superintendent. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and completed post master's studies in educational leadership at the University of Alabama.

Silberman, who will assume the Prichard Committee position on September 1, emphasized that his decision to accept the Prichard Committee position played no role in his retirement as Fayette County's superintendent, which is effective August 31.

"When I announced my retirement I said that I was still interested in doing something where I could make a difference for kids but at the same time be more available to my family," he said. "I had no idea that it would happen this fast. To work with an organization that has made such a difference for kids is truly a blessing, and it is my hope to be able to continue the great work that has been going on."

Among his many honors, Silberman has been named the Kentucky Superintendent of the Year three times and a National Superintendent of the Year finalist. The University Council for Educational Administration recognized him with its National Excellence in School Leadership Award in 2010, when he also was named National Administrator of the Year for World Languages. His community and civic activities have included serving on the boards of the United Way, Boy Scouts and the Central Kentucky Youth Orchestra and memberships in the Chamber of Commerce and numerous other organizations.

Stu and his wife, Kathy, have three grown daughters and one granddaughter.

SOURCE: Prichard Committee Press Release

Saturday, February 12, 2011

FCPS Appellee's Brief and Cross Appeal

Appellate review in Petrilli v Silberman, and whether former Booker T Washington Principal Peggy Petrilli is granted a new trial, hangs on the question of Judge James Ishmael’s threshold jury instruction:
“Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 2, 2007?”
Juries have tremendous power over people's lives. Granting them such power directly expresses our faith in the system of justice, democratic governance, and whether the public has faith that jury verdicts can be fair, unbiased, and accurate.

In recent years, however, concerns have been raised about the quality and integrity of the outcomes reached by juries. Some believe that jurors are too frequently biased, or incompetent to render just verdicts. Jurors can misunderstand instructions from the judge on legal issues, fail to recall critical evidence, or suffer from boredom during trials - particularly in complex trials.
For these reasons, and perhaps others, the quality of jury instructions is critical to guiding the jury toward a result that is based on sound legal principles rather than biased, arbitrary or sloppy reasoning.

The central question under review in Petrilli v Silberman is whether a fair set of jury instructions existed, but there's some other stuff too. The district wants the Court of Appeals to agree that Petrilli voluntarily resigned and leave Fayette County Circuit Court Judge James Ishmael's ruling undisturbed. They request the court to confirm the trial jury or alternatively grant the district's cross appeal for a directed verdict on all issues, which would pretty much do the same thing.

KSN&C had hoped to present the district’s arguments alongside those of Appellant Peggy Petrilli, but we were unable to secure the cooperation of counsel for the school district. KSN&C thanks Sam Givens at the Kentucky Court of Appeals and Judge Ishmael for their assistance.

The following is a summary of the district’s point of view.

District arguments in Petrilli v Silberman:

· The threshold jury instruction was not preserved for review. This is a procedural argument and I won’t pretend to understand its subtleties. Apparently, in order to “preserve” an issue for appellate review, the attorney must …do something…like object. Objections are preserved for appellate review only if those objections are made and ruled on in the trial court. And McNeil argues that Dale Golden’s objections came during a preliminary hearing, as KSN&C has reported. See: Nebraska Law Review for a discussion. So, if I’ve got this argument right, McNeill says Golden objected to the jury instruction during a preliminary hearing, but not in the trial court, and therefore, it was not properly preserved. I would only note that during oral argument, the judges were aware of this argument but at least two of the judges did not appear to be buying it.

· McNeill says the threshold jury instruction was proper. Golden seeks what is called a de novo review of Judge Ishmael’s threshold jury instruction and McNeill says that’s not the correct way for the court to look at it. “The threshold jury instruction was proper because once the jury found that Petrilli voluntarily resigned, she could no longer meet the essential elements necessary to prove her claims of an adverse employment action.” McNeill pins his position on the argument that Petrilli was not under any time pressure (which might give rise to a constructive discharge) because she first brought up the idea of resignation, did so with advice from counsel, negotiated her separation, and had been given options to avoid resignation, including suspension with pay, which McNeill told the court was not an adverse employment action. Again, it is not clear that the appellate judges bought this argument.

· The district argues that Petrilli had no right to a constructive discharge jury instruction because it was not properly preserved, Petrilli’s arguments are misleading, and that during the pre-trial stage of the case, Golden had argued that they were not making a constructive discharge claim.

· McNeill argues that the court erred in not granting the district a directed verdict on the reverse discrimination claim and that Petrilli did not suffer an adverse employment action. McNeill says Petrilli confuses not wanting to resign with choosing to voluntarily resign once confronted with substantial complaints about her running of the school.

· McNeill states that Petrilli was qualified to serve as principal…

· ..but that she was replaced by a white man, Jock Gum. Gum had served as an interim principal, finishing out the year. However, the hiring of Wendy Brown, a black woman, was at the core of the case, and here McNeill argues that Silberman and the board could not be held responsible because it was the school council who hired Brown.

· The district says that the court improperly failed to grant their motion for a directed verdict on retaliation claims, whistleblower claims.

· …that the trial court was correct to excuse Brenda Allen from any claims.

· …that the court properly handled jury selection.

· …that the trial court was correct to disallow testimony from Allen.

· …that the court was correct to overrule complaints from Golden against McNeill, and a requested second deposition of Doug Adams. During oral argument, one judge made statements inferring that the misconduct claim would likely go nowhere.

· …that the court was correct to overrule Petrilli’s Motion in Limine on prior bad acts when it allowed testimony on related issues at BTWA.

· …some lawyerly something about how McNeill used depositions to impeach and rehabilitate witnesses…

· That the court erred by refusing to dismiss Silberman as officially and as an individual.

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Blogging from Under the Bus

"A blogger is likened to the rail bird
that hasn't been anywhere,
hasn't done anything,
and is contemptuous of anyone who is
waging the day-to-day battles of life."

---from John Kiser's weekly communication


Clearly bloggers are defective. Everybody knows that. We're all unemployed, living in our mother's basements - just lounging around in our pajamas all day sucking up beer and hogging the doritos. So it came as a surprise to learn that FCPS bus honcho John Kiser fired a little volley at us lowly pitiful souls in his most recent transportation communication. Anyone know what prompted that?

As is our custom, KSN&C followed up on and earlier allegation we received. I wrote to district spokeswoman Lisa Deffendall to see if she could now confirm and comment on the following allegation?

That a bus driver was passed over for a position. That the employee grieved. After that, the employee was disciplined for not following in line during a field trip (or something like that) and was removed from the trip list, reducing the employees ability to earn wages. And that, by the time of Mary's ruling, 90-days had passed, rather than the 10 days required by policy, by which time, the disputed position had gone to another driver.

(NOTE: Careful KSN&C readers will note that any inuendo regarding racial motivations related to the alleged action has been dropped from the above description. Additional information from our transportation moles make that initial claim more doubtful.).

Deffendall responded,

I spoke with Stu about this and he said that he has looked into the situation, but because it is a personnel matter, he is not able to comment on it.
OK so before, the district had to look into it, and now it's a "personnel matter." We did some more investigating and it seems like that's not all it is.

Turns out the bus driver found his or her way to Frankfort and is now being represented by a certain former FCPS in-house counsel - indeed claiming that his or her grievance was buried for 90-days while the job the driver was seeking went elsewhere.

So, now Fayette County Superintendent Stu Silberman has another reason not to comment, since this matter appears to be under litigation.

Wait. It gets better.

Silberman had his outside counsel, Bob Chenoweth, send Brenda Allen a formal request to withdraw from representing the bus driver. The district is claiming that Allen's representation constitutes a conflict of interest because she would only have known about "problems with John Kiser" from being Counsel to the Board.

But get this.

When Allen was a law student in the 1990s, her job, while working for JoEllen McComb (who represents Rosalind Hurley-Richards), was "to receive all of the complaints from Fayette County School bus drivers, many of whom ultimately sued Kiser, for retaliation, harassment etc."

Allen reminded Chenoweth that he was the attorney on the other side of one of those cases.
I told them I would not be withdrawing from representing her or any of my Fayette County employee clients and that I carefully review the rules to ensure that there is no conflict before I accept their request to be their attorney. I told him it was ironic that 14 years later I have bus drivers coming to me about Kiser.
Allen told KSN&C that she was delighted to be working with Chenoweth again (even as opposing counsel) and Allen sent her regards to his wife and invited the couple to the grand opening of her restaurant.

I'm pretty sure the Hanna Report glossed over the potential fallout from outsourcing legal services in Fayette County. I'm also starting to understand why Kiser's day-to-day life is full of battles.

Our sources joked that, to them, Kiser was the true "blogger" since he doesn't have a CDL and can't drive a bus.

Apologies to BARBEE for abusing a perfectly good cartoon.

School Board to School Council Members: "Sue You"

Imagine that you are a member of your local board of education. Ponder your responsibilities. Think about how you are going to enlist all of the help you are going to need in order for your school district to be successful. You can generally count on all of the principals and most of the teachers being on board, if for no other reason than it is their job. Most will be strong supporters of improving the schools.

But what about the parents?

When schools and parents work closely together we get the best results for the kids. We see that over and over again. It is an important attribute comon to the best public schools, charter schools, and private schools.

Think about what kind of message you'd want your school board to send to the parents who serve at the school council level. Are you all partners on the same team? Or do we only want parent involvement when its convenient? And what's the board's message to the parent and teacher council members when things go wrong?

Believe it or not, this issue was touched on yesterday in the Kentucky Court of Appeals during oral arguments. It was a question of who should be held responsible if a personnel matter at the school level brought allegations of wrong doing, such as the racial discrimination claim in Petrilli v Silberman.

While representing his clients, Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman and the Board of Education, attorney John McNeill argued yesterday that it was inappropriate to sue the superintendent or board. Instead, he suggested to the court that an aggreived person should sue ... individual school council members!?

Now, as I'm sure KSN&C readers know, school council members select their school's principal from a list of qualified candidates provided by the superintendent. In the case of teachers, council members are consulted before the principal selects. In both cases, the superintendent completes the hiring process. After that, the personnel responsibilities of school council members are a big honkin' ZERO. Nothing. School council members do not consult, advise, observe (formally), evaluate, or discipline any teacher or principal who gets out of line. They have no authority to do so whatsoever. So the suggestion that these are the folks who should be sued in such cases left me bewildered.

Wondering if I was the only person who found McNeill's argument to be stunning, I went looking for a second opinion from another attorney. I happened to find one who used to run the Kentucky Association of School Councils, Susan Weston.

Weston opines,
The school-based decision making statute, KRS 160.345(2)(f), says in so many words that school councils "shall not have the authority to recommend transfers or dismissals/" School councils have a specific role in hiring: they select principals and are consulted on other vacancies. They have no role with individual personnel once they are hired. They do not evaluate, do not set evaluation rules, do not discipline, and do not terminate. And, as the law I just quoted makes clear, they don't even get to recommend that employees be removed from their current positions. Since a council has no legal role at all in a process that leads to a principal ceasing to be principal, I am mystified about how a council could be sued over activity it could not
control.

Yeah. What she said.

Now I'm betting that neither the superintendent or board of education got together to make this suggestion their unofficial policy or their legal gameplan. Tempting as it might be, I doubt our board members would really want council members to be held responsible for things beyond their control. Still, it is troubling to think that this argument is out there, before the Kentucky Court of Appeals.

What if the court agrees with McNeill? Who would want to serve on a school council then?

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Appeals Court Signals Remand of Petrilli Case

School District Attorney Argues
Plaintiffs should Sue School Councils
Rather than Superintendents
in School-based
Racial Discrimination Claims

Ruling Expected in Mid march

During Oral Argument before the Kentucky Court of Appeals today, two judges openly and repeatedly expressed doubts about Fayette County Circuit Court Judge James Ishmael’s threshold instruction to the jury in Petrilli v Silberman.

In deliberation during the trial, jurors were only allowed to consider whether they thought former Booker T Washington Principal Peggy Petrilli had resigned voluntarily. The jury made their decision while looking at a handwritten resignation letter from Petrilli that read, in its entirety, “I hereby resign my position in the Fayette County Schools” with no effective date.

None of the other issues related to civil rights, retaliation, or whistleblower claims were considered by the jury since they found her resignation to be voluntary.

That result undermined J Dale Golden’s constructive discharge claim and exonerated Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman and the Fayette County Board of Education.

Responding to an argument from Golden, Judge Kelly Thompson said, “I don’t agree with that threshold instruction either…” Later during John McNeill’s argument, Judge Glenn Acree said, “I, too, have a problem with this instruction…I’m not sure a jury understands [everything that goes into making a resignation] voluntary.”

McNeill argued that the superintendent and board weren’t guilty of anything, that the jury instruction was proper because it contained the word “voluntary,” and that Golden’s assertion of constructive discharge was made “without evidence.”

Judge James Lambert made no specific assertions during questioning but only two judges are needed to prevail on any particular point of law.

The only clue about the court's leaning on the central issue of whether Petrilli voluntarily resigned came from Judge Acree who said at one point, “It sounds like she didn’t want to leave.”

I'm no attorney but it sounds like this case may be headed back to Fayette County. But we won’t know for sure until sometime in mid March. A ruling is expected in 30 to 45 days.



Each side was given 15 minutes to argue points of law and procedures before the court. Golden, representing Appellant Peggy Petrilli, chose to argue for 10-minutes and reserve 5-minutes for rebuttal. John McNeill, representing Stu Silberman and the Board of Education used all 15-minutes for argument – thus allowing Golden to speak first and last.

Most of the court’s attention was on the threshold jury instruction, and the question of whether Kentucky’s school council laws have the effect of insulating superintendents and school boards from discrimination claims.

What did the school board do wrong? one judge asked. You tell us about the Clarks and Ms Berry but what about the board?

“If there is a racial discrimination claim, who would you sue?” Acree asked repeatedly. McNeill opined that one must sue individual school council members. Golden argued that it was appropriate to sue the superintendent who is ultimately in charge of everything.

The district filed a Cross Appeal claiming that Judge Ishmael should have issued a directed verdict on all of Petrilli’s claims because they all lacked evidence. During a pretrial hearing, Judge James Ishmael had rejected the district's request for summary judgment saying,

"Right now, I’m not comfortable that the facts are so undisputed, that I feel comfortable making a ruling as a matter of law."
Golden argued that all of Petrilli’s other claims should have survived any resignation. For example, if a woman is raped at work, she does not have to keep working there to have a case, Golden said.

From Twitter: (READ FROM THE BOTTOM UP.)

Reday000 Adjourned. Court indicates it will respond in 30 to 45 days.
Reday000 when asked...says Buddy Clark was disbarred in Chicago.
Reday000 Golden: Voluntary was not defined. Threshhold question was inappropriate.
Reday000 Golden rebuttal begins. Thompson demures on sanction question.
Reday000 McNeill denies sanctionable conduct.
Reday000 McNeill defending jury instruction because it contained the word voluntary.
Reday000 Acree: I, too, have a problem with this instruction...not sure jury understands what voluntary means...
Reday000 Acree: If there was a racial discrimination claim, who would you sue?
Reday000 District filed cross appeal saying there should have been a directed verdict on all of Petrill's claims.
Reday000 Acree: "It sounds like she didn't want to leave."
Reday000 McNeill says constructive discharge claim was without evidence.
Reday000 McNeill is up.
Reday000 Golden: "This was a hatchet job."
Reday000 Golden goes after McNeill's conduct during trial.
Reday000 Golden argues whistleblower & civil rights claims should survive any resignation.
Reday000 Brenda Allen is in attendance.
Reday000 ...what did the school board do?
Reday000 Thompson: "I don't agree with that threshhold instruction either. That's not my problem...
Reday000 Each side gets 15 minutes. Golden goes first.
Reday000 Lambert presiding. Welcomes and introduces.

Saturday, February 5, 2011

Petrilli's Appeal

The Kentucky Court of Appeals takes up the case of Petrilli v Silberman Tuesday.

In preparation for the hearing KSN&C asked both sides for a copy of their appellate briefs, which are essentially public records. Only one side (attorney J Dale Golden) complied with our request. In a conversation with FCPS attorney John McNeill, KSN&C was told that he didn't see any problem giving us a copy - that is until he realized who we were. Once he recalled, he declined. Go figure.

The central issue on appeal is a threshold jury instruction that boiled the entire case down to the question of whether Appellant Peggy Petrilli, the former principal of Booker T Washington Academy, voluntarily resigned - period. Covering the trial, I recall being stunned by that instruction at the time.

Jurors deliberated for about 3 1/2 hours before concluding that Petrilli "voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 27, 2007."

Petrilli claims the jury instruction was inappropriate since she was actually forced out by Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman in what is known as a constructive discharge.

KSN&C Timeline of the events here
.

Golden throws a lot of spaghetti at the wall arguing:


· Federal law is applicable in interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.

· The trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower.

· Petrilli Was Entitled to a Directed Verdict on Her Reverse Race Discrimination Claim.

· Petrilli’s Motion For a Directed Verdict On Her Retaliation Claim Should Be Granted AND THE THRESHOLD INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS.

· the trial court erred in failing to give a separate instruction on whistleblower, failing to direct a verdict, and failing to give a punitive damages instruction.

· It was Error to Dismiss Petrilli’s Constitutional Claims and the Trial Court Erred in Failing to Direct a Verdict on Behalf of Petrilli on her Constitutional Claims.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CLAIMS AGAINST ALLEN.

· The trial Court erred in its handling of the Batson issue.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PETRILLI’S MOTION IN LIMINE ON CHARACTER EVIDENCE.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SANCTION ATTORNEY MCNEILL AND IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE SECOND DEPOSITION OF DOUG ADAMS.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PREVENTING PETRILLI FROM TESTING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE “ADVICE OF COUNSEL” DEFENSE.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED MCNEILL TO READ FROM DEPOSITIONS. (emphasis in original)


Petrilli is asking the Court of Appeals to :

1. Reverse the trial court for use of a threshold instruction;

2. A directed verdict for Petrilli on the issues of protected class, being qualified for her position, and being replaced by a person of a different race;

3. A directed verdict for Petrilli on the adverse employment issue or, at the very least, a jury instruction setting forth the elements of constructive discharge as tendered by Petrilli;

4. Reverse the trial court and find that Petrilli is entitled to a punitive damages instruction regarding the whistleblower claim;

5. Reverse the trial court’s directed verdict on Petrilli’s constitutional claim;

6. Reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against Allen and the other Defendants;

7. Reverse the trial court’s arbitrary discovery deadline of August 27, 2007;

8. Allow Petrilli to take the discovery deposition of Allen;

9. Reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motions in limine regarding character evidence;

10. Allow Petrilli to retake Adams’ deposition, sanction opposing counsel for his misconduct and award costs and attorneys’ fees; and

11. Direct a verdict in favor of Petrilli on all constitutional claims;

12. Permit Petrilli to test the sufficiency of the “advice of counsel” defense;

13. Reverse the trial court’s erroneous ruling which allowed for improper impeachment and rehabilitation; and,

14. Remand this matter for a new trial.

The crux of the appellant's brief is...

B. The trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower. (Preserved at 7/28/09, 08:05:20—09:20:00 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8).

This Court uses a de novo standard of review for erroneous jury instructions.[1] The jury was given the following improper threshold jury instruction:

Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 2, 2007?[2]

The jury marked “yes” and returned to the courtroom where the trial judge discharged them from further duties. The threshold instruction was given in error because it is completely different from the elements of Petrilli’s claims for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower, as demonstrated by the jury instructions given by the court.[3]

Petrilli was entitled to a jury instruction regarding her claim of constructive discharge. The standard for constructive discharge is whether the “conditions created by the employer’s action are so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.”[4] Thus, what may appear to a layman on the jury to be a voluntary resignation may in fact have been compelled by an employer’s conduct. Petrilli was entitled to a jury instruction explaining the difference. In addition, proof of a constructive discharge is but one of a myriad of things that satisfy the requirement of an adverse employment action that is necessary for a reverse discrimination instruction[5] and a retaliation jury instruction.[6]

In Brooks, the court noted: “While constructive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the KCRA, not all adverse employment actions constitute constructive discharge.”[7] Although Petrilli submitted a constructive discharge instruction, none was given.[8] Constructive discharge instructions are submitted to the jury in these types of cases because a constructive discharge is a type of adverse employment action.[9] The pivotal issue is whether the employee felt compelled to resign. However, the act of resignation as a part of a constructive discharge is but one of many potential adverse employment actions available to support a jury verdict.

(1) The Elements of a reverse discrimination claim are as follows:

(a) Petrilli is a member of a protected class;

(b) She experienced an adverse employment action;

(c) She was qualified for her position of employment; and

(d) She was replaced by a person of a different race.[10]

(2) The elements of a retaliation claim are as follows:

(a) She engaged in a protected activity under KRS 344.040;

(b) This activity was known to the Defendants;

(c) Defendants took an adverse employment action against Petrilli; and

(d) A causal connection exists between that adverse employment action and the Petrilli’s exercise of the protected activity.[11]


(3) The elements for a whistleblower claim are as follows:

(a) She reported actual or suspected violations of law, mandates, rules or policies;

(b) The Defendants caused her to be subjected to reprisal or directly or indirectly used official authority or influence against her as a result of her report.[12]

The trial court specifically found that Petrilli waived all of her claims against the Defendants when she resigned.[13] This rationale on the part of the trial court was erroneous because employers cannot absolve themselves of liability by successfully compelling employees to resign. If Petrilli resigned on a Wednesday, it does not negate retaliation exercised against her in violation of the whistleblower statute that occurred on the prior Tuesday or any day prior to that. In fact, it is not uncommon for employees to resign from their employment when employers act in an unlawful manner.

The discrimination and retaliation claims share a common element of an “adverse employment action.” Thus, if Petrilli resigns on a Wednesday, it does not negate retaliation, or discrimination, or reprisal that occurred on the prior Tuesday or any day prior to that. Again, it is not uncommon for employees to resign from their employment when employees act in an unlawful manner. Petrilli’s resignation is not dispositive because constructive discharge is but one of a myriad of potential adverse employment actions that satisfy the prima facie elements of discrimination and retaliation.

[W]hile constructive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the KCRA, not all adverse employment actions constitute constructive discharge.[14]

Thus, an adverse employment action includes, but is not limited to, “constructive discharge.” Violations of the law can occur prior to, during, or even after an employee attempts to resign.

Voluntariness is but one component of the larger issue of constructive discharge. Along the same vein, Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, held that a “resignation is involuntary and coerced when the totality of the circumstances indicates the employee did not have the opportunity to make a free choice.”[15] Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force advises that, in order “to determine whether a resignation or retirement is voluntary, a court must examine the surrounding circumstances to test the ability of the employee to exercise free choice.”[16] Furthermore, “voluntariness is vitiated when one” of the following occurs:

· Employee resigns under duress;

· Employee unsuccessfully tries to withdraw resignation before its effective date;

· Employee submits a resignation under time pressure;

· Employee fails to understand the situation due to mental incompetence; or

· Resignation obtained by misrepresentation or deception.[17]

There was ample evidence presented concerning the strict time constraints imposed on Petrilli. This is important, because a true, voluntary resignation is done when the employee wants to do it, not when the employer orders it done by a certain time.

In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Stosberg, the Plaintiff signed a resignation letter after her employer attempted to force her to transfer to another location.[18] In effect, the circumstances her employer placed her in left her with no other option. The court thus determined that a constructive discharge occurs where the “conditions created by the employer’s actions” compel the Plaintiff to resign.[19] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton, et al. also deals with a situation in which two employees tendered resignation letters.[20] In that case, the employees resigned after their supervisor stopped speaking to them and began assigning their lunch and break times. The jury ultimately found that the employees had been constructively discharged. The Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeals stated that, “while the conditions alleged may not have been the most egregious imaginable, they surely rise to the level that the jury had sufficient evidence to find a constructive discharge.”[21]

Walther testified at length about Petrilli’s financial constraints due to the fact that, unlike teachers, administrators are not covered by the KEA insurance and, therefore, administrators have to pay for their own attorneys.[22] Thus, Petrilli would have paid $25,000.00 at a minimum to go through the tribunal process, while having no money coming in from the school, and while having to care for her adult son, who resides with her and has the mind of a 5-year-old.[23] Certainly, this Court can see that Petrilli recognized that she had no choice and that Silberman was not going to follow the due-process procedures set out in the KAR, KRS, and the Board’s policies. Therefore, the only option Petrilli had was to resign and try to obtain employment elsewhere. She attempted to do this and part ways with Silberman; however, Silberman and Allen manufactured the “investigative memorandum” some 8 months later as an insurance policy against the lawsuit Petrilli was about to file. Having successfully tarred and feathered Petrilli, despite the subsequent finding by the Kentucky Department of Education that there was not enough evidence to support the charges, Petrilli is unemployable in her chosen profession.

In Schultz v. U.S. Navy, the court concluded that “an ostensibly voluntary resignation which was submitted as a result of agency coercion…must be treated the same as an adverse action.”[24] Furthermore, a

resignation is not voluntary where an agency imposes the terms of an employee’s resignation, the employee’s circumstances permit no alternative but to accept, and those circumstances were the result of improper acts of the agency.[25]

The fact that Petrilli’s resignation was not voluntary is demonstrated by the correspondence between Walther and Allen.[26] It was Allen who added on to the correspondence that Petrilli would not reapply in the future for a position with Fayette County Public Schools.[27] It is clear that, if Petrilli had truly voluntarily resigned, she would have simply walked away. It is unconscionable that she had to try and negotiate with Silberman that she be able to leave her employment without mudslinging.

Silberman’s article in the Herald-Leader, stating that Petrilli was not going back to BTWA; his offer of the Northern principalship, followed by a vindictive decision to threaten Petrilli with suspension; and Silberman’s refusal to comply with the evaluation instrument, due process, and evaluation requirements mandated by the KAR and KRS are all indicative of a constructive discharge. “Constructive discharge presents a question of fact that, in jury trials, should be decided by the jury and not the trial court.”[28] The court’s threshold instruction was thus erroneous.
KSN&C will report from the hearing on Tuesday.

[1] Hamilton v. CSX Trans., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky.App. 2006).

[2] Record at 2162.

[3] Record at 2163-2167.

[4] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[5] Record 2163.

[6] Record 2165.

[7] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[8] Record at 2053-2070.

[9] See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982).

[10] Fuelling v. New Vision, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 13915 (6th Cir, 2008) at 14; see also Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001) Further, according to Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152 (D.C., 1993), the burden for proving these prima facie elements is “not onerous.”

[11] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Ky. 2004).

[12] Record 2167.

[13] Hearing on the jury instructions to be given, 7/28/09, 08:10:47—08:11:51 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8.

[14] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[15]Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).

[16]Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574 (U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Pearlman v. United States, 490 F.2d 928, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).

[17] Scharf at 1574. (Emphasis added.)

[18] Commonwealth of Ky v. Stosberg, 948 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. App. 1997).

[19] Id. at 427.

[20] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton and Howell, 56 S.W.3d 440 (Ky. App. 2001).

[21] Id. at 446.

[22] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:00:57, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[23] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:24:04, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[24] Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

[25] Id. See also Edgerton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 768 F.2d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1985.).

[26] Petrilli Test. 07/16/09, 03:27:50 p.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-2; see also PX 13, App. 28.

[27] Id.

[28] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).


[1] Hamilton v. CSX Trans., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky.App. 2006).

[2] Record at 2162.

[3] Record at 2163-2167.

[4] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[5] Record 2163.

[6] Record 2165.

[7] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[8] Record at 2053-2070.

[9] See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982).

[10] Fuelling v. New Vision, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 13915 (6th Cir, 2008) at 14; see also Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001) Further, according to Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152 (D.C., 1993), the burden for proving these prima facie elements is “not onerous.”

[11] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Ky. 2004).

[12] Record 2167.

[13] Hearing on the jury instructions to be given, 7/28/09, 08:10:47—08:11:51 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8.

[14] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[15]Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).

[16]Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574 (U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Pearlman v. United States, 490 F.2d 928, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).

[17] Scharf at 1574. (Emphasis added.)

[18] Commonwealth of Ky v. Stosberg, 948 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. App. 1997).

[19] Id. at 427.

[20] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton and Howell, 56 S.W.3d 440 (Ky. App. 2001).

[21] Id. at 446.

[22] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:00:57, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[23] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:24:04, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[24] Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

[25] Id. See also Edgerton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 768 F.2d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1985.).

[26] Petrilli Test. 07/16/09, 03:27:50 p.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-2; see also PX 13, App. 28.

[27] Id.

[28] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).